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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Korean Situation. 28 June 1950. Report of the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C., on the Korean Situation, 28 June 1950. The report is based on information received from the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C., on the Korean Situation, 28 June 1950. The report is based on information received from the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C., on the Korean Situation, 28 June 1950.

I. Military Situation.

Information received from General MacArthur's Headquarters (CINCPAC) at 0700 on 28 June Washington time states that both Kimpo airfield and Seoul have fallen to northern forces. There was no indication of surrender by southern forces and northern forces were reported contained north of the Han River. Press reports state, however, that the northern advance has continued across the Han in the direction of Suwon, 20 miles south of Seoul. There are no reports on the military effectiveness of US air intervention, but CINCPAC reports a maximum effort consistent with safety is scheduled for Thursday Korea time (Wednesday evening Washington time). G-4 CINCPAC reports there is no evidence of a logistic build-up in northern Korea to support extensive operations, but CIA believes that such a build-up may have occurred over the past year and that northern forces have adequate logistic support to continue full-scale military operations for an extended period.

Brigadier General Church, USA, is assuming command of KMAC in Korea, but CINCPAC reports that CINCPAC's operating authority does not include command of southern Korean forces.

CIA estimates that northern forces have the intention and capability for continued advances south of the Han River; but believes that the advance will be slowed or halted, permitting southern units to regroup within two days in the vicinity of Suwon.

II. Survival Potential.

Prospects for maintaining cohesive southern Korean resistance are improving. The early release to southern Korean authorities of promises of US aid and involvement had an important and timely effect on southern Korean morale. Although the momentum of the

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north Korean advance does not appear to have been halted completely and the fall of Seoul and other important locations must have been blows to south Korean morale, operations by the US Air Force will prove a tremendous psychological boost to the south Korean Government, armed forces, and people. The latest official report indicated no sign of panic among the people. President Rhee, on learning of US plans, was reported as anxious to return to Seoul but was dissuaded. Because Korean morale, particularly that of the armed forces, appears to have hinged upon the crucial factor of the enemy's exclusive possession of armor and preponderance of fighter aircraft, in terms of morale the tide should have turned, at least for the moment. The south Korean Army, if able to regroup, will now have a far greater will to fight. Chances of maintaining organized resistance are improving.

R. H. HILLENKOTTER  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Director of Central Intelligence

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